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Abstract
This paper examines the price formation process under small numbers com-
petition using data from Singapore land auctions. The theory predicts that bid
prices are less than the zero-profit asset value in these first-price sealed-bid
auctions. The model also shows that expected sales price increases with the
number of bidders both because each bidder has an incentive to oﬀer a higher
price and because of a greater likelihood that a high-value bidder is present.
The empirical estimates are consistent with auction theory and show that the
standard land attributes are reflected in auction prices as expected.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the price formation process under small numbers competition.
The neoclassical competitive bid price model envisions an implicit auction in which
the highest bidding land use obtains the land and competition drives profits to zero.
The model provides the foundation for modern land use theory and underlies most
applied property markets analysis. The framework is easy to apply and capable of
predicting how a variety of factors, including risk, aﬀect the market price of land.
The question of price formation, however, is subsumed within the competitive zero
profit condition and therefore, by construction, the standard bid price model cannot
evaluate the consequences of situations in which finite numbers of agents interact.
The literature has taken several alternative paths to study price formation in real
estate markets. One approach focuses on the search and matching aspect of many
property markets (particularly the housing market), an extensive line of literature
that is growing rapidly. A second approach focuses on the negotiation process often
observed in face-to-face real estate market transactions, typically relying on Nash
bargaining or similar equilibrium constructs to model price formation. The empirical
evidence in this line of literature is much less extensive, depending as it does upon
data that is not widely available. These two approaches are similar in that they
diverge from the standard competitive bid price equilibrium assumption, but diﬀer
in the market dimension upon which they focus: the role of search versus bargaining
power in determining selling price. The third approach studies the performance of
structured markets, like formal auctions, in which price formation is determined by
well-defined rules governing bidding and acceptance by finite numbers of buyers and
sellers.
This paper takes the third approach to studying price formation under small
numbers competition. It begins with the recognition that the neoclassical bid price
model depicts prices "as if" determined by auctions (although the structure of the
implicit auction is not spelled out in any but the vaguest terms). It follows the logical
connection of the implicit bid price-auction market nexus, beginning with a formal
model of an auction process that yields the bid price formulation as a limiting case,
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then using the model to study the properties of the expected auction outcome as the
finite number of participants varies.
Even though there are not many empirical studies of real estate auctions, the
few that have been published are beginning to build a picture of regularities and
anomalies. For example, there is a growing consensus that real estate sold in auctions
appears to sell at a discount relative to full exposure to a market comprising searching
buyers (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992; Mayer, 1998; Allen and Swisher, 2000; Ching
and Fu, 2003). Other aspects of open-bid auctions, however, are not so clear-cut. For
example, while Lusht (1994) and Mayer (1998) find that auction prices tend to be
lower for units sold early in the auction, Allen and Swisher (2000) find that prices
tend to increase as the auction proceeds.
Of course, analyzing auctions requires data, and the paucity of such data largely
explains why there is not much empirical work studying real estate auction mar-
kets. Singapore’s Sale of Sites program presents another opportunity to study price
properties in an actual auction market. While there are relatively few empirical stud-
ies of real estate auctions in general, first-price sealed-bid auctions like Singapore’s
have been virtually ignored. Thus, one contribution of this paper is that it presents
empirical evidence regarding a type of auction largely overlooked in the real estate
literature. A second contribution arises from the type of property being auctioned.
While several of the existing studies of real estate auctions pertain to property oﬀered
for sale as the result of foreclosure or financial duress liquidations, our sample com-
prises land being oﬀered under normal market conditions. Finally, each auction in
our data set comprises a single fully assembled land parcel oﬀered for sale by the Sin-
gapore Government. This auction structure avoids introducing the pricing anomalies
related to the sales sequence and heterogeneity of property oﬀerings found in earlier
studies.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple sealed-bid model
corresponding to the Singapore land auction and uses the model to show how diﬀerent
factors aﬀect bidding strategies and the resultant land price. Section 3 oﬀers a brief
description of the Singapore Sale of Sites auction program. The empirical analysis is
reported in Section 4 and the last section concludes.
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2 Bidding for Land in an Auction
This is a model of a first-price sealed-bid auction. There is a single seller oﬀering
one parcel of land for sale. A finite number of interested buyers determine their bids
and then simultaneously present them to the seller. The seller awards the land to the
highest bidder at that bid price.
Potential bidders for the specific parcel of land are identified by the expected
value they attach to the land, the net return in its developed use, v. Diﬀerent types
of bidders have diﬀerent anticipated v values. Unless otherwise stated, however, all
potential bidders are identical except for their land valuation v. The distribution of
bidder types is given by G(v) continuously defined over the range of property values
[vl, vu]. The realized net return to the winning bidder is uncertain ex ante, and equals
v + ε, where the stochastic term ε is distributed with mean zero and finite variance,
V AR(ε).
This is a private information game environment.1 While a given bidder i knows his
own type (v) and the number of other bidders who will make oﬀers for the property,
bidder i does not know the other types against which he will be bidding in the auction,
that is, each bidder does not know the underlying v value other bidders have for the
property. Each bidder does know, however, that the population of potential bidders,
from which the N actual bidders are drawn, is distributed G(v).
Consider bidder i, whose expected value of the land is vi. The individual bidder’s
problem is to oﬀer the bid bi that maximizes the expected utility from the land.
Define P as the probability of bidder i winning the auction. The probability of the
single bidder making a high enough bid to obtain the land, given the potential bids
from others, is increasing in the own bid, P 0 > 0. Given the stochastic return to
other investments or development projects of the bidder is ω, the expected utility is
Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε) when i oﬀers the highest bid and wins the auction and Eu(ω)
1McAﬀee and McMillan (1987) provide an overview of the early auction literature in economics
and Quan (1994) and Mayer (1995) discuss real estate applications. Jehle and Reny (2001, 373-399)
examine the properties of various canonical auctions using the Nash equilibrium solution concept
employed here. Our formulation diﬀers from their cannonical models in several respects: asset value
is uncertain ex ante, risk aversion is allowed, and our focus is solely on optimal strategies of bidders
in a sealed-bid auction for a single asset.
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when he does not. For bidder i the expected utility from the auction is
EV = P (bi)Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε) + (1− P (bi))Eu(ω)
where the expectation operator is understood to be taken with respect to ω and ε.
Since the bids of all N bidders are simultaneously oﬀered as sealed single bids,
we consider the auction outcome as a Nash equilibrium. Using the Nash solution
concept, the optimal bidding pattern of each individual is determined conditional
upon the (optimal) bids of all other participants. Of course, the actual bids of other
participants is unknown for a given bidder i when deciding on the bidding strategy.
Under our private information assumption, each bidder views the other N−1 bidders
as random draws from the known distribution of bidder types, G(v).
The optimal bid bi is that which maximizes the expected utility of bidder i. As
such, the optimal bid satisfies the marginal bid condition
EVb = P
0(bi)[Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε)−Eu(ω)]− P (bi)Eu0(ω + vi − bi + ε) = 0 (1)
We assume that the appropriate second order condition (SOC) holds so that
EVbb = P 00(bi)[Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε)− Eu(ω)] + P (bi)Eu00(ω + vi − bi + ε) < 0 (2)
The optimality condition (1) implies Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε) > Eu(ω), which in turn
requires that bid, bi, be less than the risk-adjusted net asset value. Notice that the
optimal bid is monotonic in vi; implicitly diﬀerentiating (1) yields
∂bi
∂vi
= −P
0Eu0(ω + vi − bi + ε)− PEu00(ω + vi − bi + ε)
EVbb
> 0
under risk neutrality or risk aversion. The bid strategy function b(v) implicitly de-
fined by (1) is the upward-sloped curve aa depicted in Figure 1. This curve shows
the optimal bid to be oﬀered by a bidder with underlying land valuation v. When all
bidders are identical except for their land valuation, the Nash equilibrium describing
the auction outcome is symmetric in the sense that each buyer’s bid is solely deter-
mined by his land valuation, and is read oﬀ of the strategy function b(v) depicted by
aa in Figure 1. The highest realized v drawn from G(v) obtains the land with the
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highest bid. Thus, the comparative static properties of the auction can be inferred
using the bid strategy function(s) for the population of potential buyers.
We use the change-of-variables formulation to put marginal-cumulative density
ratio in terms of distribution of underlying asset values, a more convenient expression.
The optimal bid of bidder type v is b(v) so that the probability that bidder i whose
bid is bi wins the auction is
P (bi) =
µZ bi
b(vl)
dF (b)
¶N−1
where F (b(v)) ≡ G(v) holds using the change-of-variables property of the probability
distribution for monotonic b(v). In Nash equilibrium, this implies
P (bi) =
µZ bi
b(vl)
dF (b)
¶N−1
=
µZ vi
vl
dG(v)
¶N−1
This means that the marginal-cumulative density ratio can be expressed as
P 0
P
=
g(vi)(N − 1)
³R vi
vl
dG(v)
´N−2
³R vi
vl
dG(v)
´N−1 = (N − 1) g(vi)R vi dG(v)
so that the optimal bid condition for bidder i can be rewritten as
(N − 1) g(vi)R vi dG(v)[Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε)−Eu(ω)]−Eu0(ω + vi − bi + ε) = 0 (3)
The SOC assumed for the maximum also requires
D = −(N − 1) g(vi)R vi dG(v)[Eu0(ω + vi − bi + ε)−Eu0(ω)] +Eu00(ω + vi − bi + ε) < 0.
The first question concerns what happens as the number of participating bidders
rises. Implicit diﬀerentiation of the optimal bid condition (3) leaves
∂bi
∂N
=
g(vi)[Eu(ω + vi − bi + ε)−Eu(ω)]
−D
R vi
0
dG(v)
> 0
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where the sign follows from D < 0 and (3). This result is what is usually argued
on intuitive grounds: the optimal bid from each type of bidder rises as the number of
bidders in the auction rises, shifting the bid strategy curve from aa to cc in Figure
1. In addition, (3) reveals that bi approaches the risk-adjusted expected value of the
property to the bidder with greaterN so that the optimal bidding strategy approaches
the neoclassical competitive market bid price characterization in the limit.2 Further,
since all individual bid prices rise with N while at the same time the probability of
drawing a higher-value bidder as the number of bidders rises as N rises, the above
result implies a higher expected selling price in the auction with greater number of
bidders.
Mayer (1995) leads to a similar conclusion but for a diﬀerent reason. He argues
that auctions lead to sales prices that are lower than generally obtained from direct
negotiation because auctions limit the market exposure of the asset being sold. Put
simply, auctions yield lower prices than direct sales because the limited time frame
of the auction reduces the sample of available buyers and lowers the likelihood of a
higher value buyer (higher vi in our model) in the market during the limited selling
period. Thus, increasing the number of bidders increases the likelihood of a high
value bidder in the pool of buyers, thereby increasing the expected auction price.
In contrast, in our model increasing the sample of potential buyers increases ex-
pected sales price both because of the greater likelihood of higher value buyers in
attendance as well as changes in each buyer’s optimal bidding strategy. Each buyer’s
optimal strategy balances the probability of winning the auction against the lower net
return from a higher bid, and the optimal bid is generally lower than that which yields
zero risk-adjusted profit. Increasing the number of bidders increases the optimal bid
of each potential buyer because increasing the number of rival bidders lowers each
bidder’s marginal probability of winning, providing an incentive for each bidder to
work harder to obtain the asset by increasing his bid. Added to the greater likelihood
of drawing in a high value bidder (as in Mayer (1995)), both eﬀects together lead to
2The opportunity cost of a land developer is Eu(ω) in our model. The expected utility from the
land for developer type v is Eu(ω + v − b+ ε). The developer’s bid price for the land is that which
equates the expected utility from the land and his opportunity cost, or Eu(ω+ v− b+ ε) = Eu(ω),
which is the condition derived from (3) in the limit as N →∞.
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higher expected selling price in the auction as the number of bidders rises.
Given the expected auction price approaches the competitive bid price in the
limit as the number of bidders rises, it should not be surprising that many of the
auction solution characteristics qualitatively resemble those of the neoclassical bid
price equilibrium. As an example, consider how diﬀerent innate valuations of the
land changes the bid structure, hence the auction price. Modeling a greater innate
land value to bidders as a rightward shift in the distribution G(v), define the expected
property values θv + v, where θv is a nonstochastic shift parameter. Substituting for
v in the optimal bid condition (3) and diﬀerentiating yields the comparative static
result, evaluated at θv = 0 :µ
∂bi
∂θv
¶
θv=0
= −
Ã
(N − 1) g(vi)R vi
0 dG(v)
Eu0(ω + vi − bi + ε)
−Eu00(ω + vi − bi + ε)
!
D−1 > 0
where sign follows using non-risk loving assumption, u00 ≤ 0, and the fact that the
marginal-cumulative density ratio g/
R
dG is unchanged with the distribution trans-
lation used here. Thus, the rightward shift in the property value distribution (or
equivalently, the distribution of bidder types) increases the optimal bid of each type
of bidder, thereby implying a higher expected selling price in the auction. This is cer-
tainly intuitively plausible; the greater the underlying value of the property from the
perspective of all potential bidders, the higher the equilibrium auction price. In terms
of the empirical analysis, this result ties the standard underlying valued characteris-
tics of the land, like location-specific amenities, neighborhood aﬀects, or accessibility
to desired locations, to the expected auction price.
We can similarly show that larger multiple-project bidders will bid more for the
land. To do so, denote E[ω] = ω so that an increase in ω pertains to a larger
multiple-project bidder. Using D < 0 and (3) we have
∂bi
∂ω
= −
µ
(N − 1)g(vi)Eu
0(ω)R vi dG(v) −D
¶
D−1 > 0
On the other hand, if larger operations running multiple projects enjoy portfolio
eﬀects that lower the variance of outcomes, this lower variance of other project net
returns has its own risk eﬀects on the optimal bid for this parcel of land. Let θω denote
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the distribution risk parameter such that dV AR(ω)/dθ > 0. Use ω = ω + θωεω and
diﬀerentiate the optimal bid condition with respect to θω, evaluated the result at
θω = 1 to find the eﬀect of an increase in the mean-preserving-spread of ω as
∂bi
∂θω
=
Ã
−(N − 1) g(vi)R vi dG(v)E[u0(ω + vi − bi + ε)εw − u0(ω)εω]
+E[u00(ω + vi − bi + ε)εω]
!
D−1 (4)
E[u0(ω+vi−bi+ε)εw−u0(ω)εω] takes the sign of COV [Eε[u0(ω+vi−bi+ε)−u0(ω)], εω].
Using the properties of similar-dissimilar ordering to evaluate this covariance,
∂Eε[u0(ω + vi − bi + ε)− u0(ω)]
∂εω
= Eεu00(ω + vi − bi + ε)− u00(ω)
≈ Eεu00(ω) +Eεu000(ω)(vi − bi + ε)− u00(ω)
= Eεu
000(ω)(vi − bi + ε)
= u000(ω)Eε[vi − bi + ε]
= u000(ω)(vi − bi) > 0
where Eε denotes the expectation taken over ε. The second line takes the second
order approximation to the first r.h.s. term, the third and fourth lines exploit the
fact that ω can be moved outside the Eε operator, and the fifth line uses E[ε] = 0
and u000 > 0 under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion (CARA or DARA).
Thus (4) implies non-increasing absolute risk aversion is suﬃcient to establish
∂bi
∂θω
< 0
so that bidders who enjoy lower total portfolio risk from greater diversification in
other projects or investments have the incentive to bid more for the parcel of land
being auctioned. Graphically, the bid strategy curve for diversified bidders lies above
that pictured for less diversified bidders, e.g., cc relative to aa in Figure 1.3
Finally, the usual characterization of CARA or DARA is suﬃcient to establish
that greater riskiness of development returns leads to lower bids and expected auction
price. This result is easily shown. Define the risk parameter θε such that land
3Note that the fact that one bid strategy curve lies above another does not imply that buyers
with the lower bid strategy curve cannot win the auction. It just implies that for lower bid strategy
buyers to win the auction, the "draw" of higher bid strategy curve buyers will have to end up being
from the lower end of the value distribution.
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value are v + θεε. An increase in θε increases the spread of the realized land value
(dV AR(v + θεε)/dθε > 0) without aﬀecting the mean (dE[v + θεε]/dθε = 0) and so
represents a mean-preserving increase in ε−risk. Substituting into the optimal bid
condition (3), implicitly diﬀerentiating, and evaluating the result at θε = 1 yields
∂bi
∂θε
=
µ
E[u00(ω + vi − bi + ε)ε]− (N − 1)
g(vi)R vi dG(v)E[u0(ω + vi − bi + ε)ε]
¶
D−1 < 0
using E[u0(ω+vi−bi+ε)ε] < 0 under risk aversion and E[u00(ω+vi−bi+ε)ε] > 0 under
CARA or DARA. Greater development returns riskiness shifts the bid strategy curve
downwards from cc to aa in Figure 1, leading to lower bids hence a lower expected
auction price.
3 Sale of Sites (SOS) Auction Program in Singa-
pore
The Singapore property market suﬀered a variety of aﬄictions in the early 1960s:
overcrowding, dilapidated housing, large numbers of squatters, poor hygiene and
sanitation, limited social amenities and congested traﬃc. Recognizing the importance
of involving the private sector to transform the urban landscape of the new nation,
the Singapore Government initiated the Sales of Sites (SOS) program. Under this
program, the government used its compulsory powers to acquire fragmented urban
land plots, amalgamating them and then oﬀering them free of encumbrances to the
private sector for development.
All of the site sales are handled by two local government agencies, the Urban
Redevelopment Authority (URA) and the Housing and Development Board (HDB),
with the URA handling 58% of development sites and the HDB handling 42%. The
HDB is primarily responsible for sales of sites located within the boundary of public
housing estates, which are usually designated for lower end private housing or sub-
urban style commercial development. The URA, on the other hand, handles the sale
of sites that are located outside the public housing estates. For residential develop-
ments, the URA sites are usually located within established private residential areas,
while the commercial sites are mostly located within the commercial business district
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(CBD).
The land is sold through a first-price sealed-bid auction. The process is, briefly, as
follows. When a development site is released for sale, interested bidders are invited
to purchase a Developer’s Packet containing the planning and design guidelines for
the site and other specific conditions for the sale. The sites usually entail a lease-
hold tenure of 99-years for commercial, hotel and private residential development and
60-years for industrial development. Depending on the complexity of the proposed
development and other constraints on the site, interested bidders are given between
two and four months to carry out their due diligence and prepare the tender sub-
mission. By noon on the closing date of the auction, the bidders must deposit their
sealed-bid together with a deposit equivalent to 10% of the bid amount. The bids are
opened and the names of all bidders and their respective bids are posted on the same
day. The site is then awarded to the highest bid exceeding the reserve price.4 Thus,
in a sealed-bid auction in Singapore, a given bidder may not know with certainty
the number of other bidders who will make oﬀers for the property until the tender
results are revealed. Whilst the number of actual potential bidders in the market is
small, especially for large development sites, some auctions may attract new bidders.
Hence, sealed-bid is the preferred method of sale in Singapore (instead of an open
auction) because it is believed to reduce the probability of collusion among potential
bidders.
Once the highest bidder has been awarded the site, the government agency mon-
itors the development progress closely in order to ensure that the outcome is in
accordance with the planning and technical requirements stipulated in the auction
submission. The successful bidder is also prohibited from selling the site (that is, the
leasehold) to outside parties. In addition, the bidder must complete the development
within the specified time frame in order to avoid punitive fines for late completion.
In total, 202 public sites were sold for residential development between 1990 and
4While past auctions considered planning concepts, design merits and other tender conditions,
the current auction system bases awards on price alone. The reserve price, which is not revealed to
bidders, is set equal to 85% of the Chief Valuer’s assessed market value for the development site.
The valuation, which is submitted by the Chief Valuer in a sealed envelop before the tender closing
date, is opened at the same time as the received bids.
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2002. Table 1 reports the breakdown of sales by year. No sales took place between
1998 and 1999 while the SOS program was suspended during the extended property
market slump in Singapore. Of the 202 sites in our sample over 1990-2002, 191
were for purely residential developments. The remaining 11 sites allowed mixed-
use developments with a substantial residential component; 9 included some retail
activities and 2 coupled the residential component with development for oﬃce use.
The majority of sites (140) was for high-rise multiple-unit residential developments—
either as apartments (with minimal communal facilities), condominiums (larger devel-
opments with a full range of communal facilities), or executive condominiums (with a
10-year restriction on resale and occupation). Sixty two of the sites were designated
for low-rise landed developments (that is, bungalows, detached, semi-detached, and
linked houses).
Most successful bidders are single buyers (170 sites); 32 sites were acquired by
joint-venture developers. One half of the successful purchasers are publicly listed firms
and one half are privately owned (each type acquired 101 sites). Only 13 development
sites were acquired by companies linked to the government. In addition, almost all
sites were obtained by locally incorporated companies. Also, not surprisingly, most
winning bidders are either real estate firms or firms with prior real estate development
experience.
Table 2 defines the variables used in the empirical model described below and
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 202 sold sites. Re-
ferring to the latter, the winning bid price ranges from a minimum of S$2.7 million to
S$682.8 million. The average winning bid price for the 202 parcels is S$89.7 million.
The average parcel size is 19,115 sq. m. and the average plot ratio (the allowed ratio
of floor space to land area) is 1.96.
Singapore occupies a small physical area. The greatest distance of a sold plot to
a subway station is only slightly above 4 km. Similarly, the development site farthest
from the CBD is only 23 km. In view of the short distances involved, we expect a
relatively flat rent gradient in Singapore.
One average, each auction attracted 6.3 bids. The most popular site attracted 20
bids and the 11 least popular sites attracted only one bid each. (Recall, though, that
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even single bidders must bid against the uncertain reservation price so that single
bidder auctions resemble 2 bidder auctions in our model.)
4 The Empirical Price Model
The hedonic price function implied by the auction framework in Section 2 identifies
the relevant variables as those reflecting underlying value (as reflected in the v distri-
bution function), buyer characteristics (as reflected in the ω−risk and ε−risk terms),
and the degree of competition (as reflected by the number of competing bidders and
number of alternative sites oﬀered for sale within the same time frame). We use
the popular semi-log functional form, regressing the logarithm of selling price on the
variables identified below. Table 4 reports the relevant parameter estimates for six
versions of the empirical model.
Overall, the estimated models are significant and explain over 80% of the observed
land price variation. This is surprisingly high in light of earlier empirical research on
vacant land markets (Colwell and Munneke, 1997).
4.1 Site attributes
The first group of variables are included in the price functions to pick up the eﬀects
of site location, parcel size, and other site-specific characteristics. The primary parcel
location attributes are captured by the distance from the commercial business dis-
trict (CBD) and the distance from the nearest metro station (variously measured by
METRO DIST, CLOSE, andWALK ). The CBD coeﬃcient is negative and significant
in almost all of the models. This is a straightforward result and is as expected.
On the other hand, the value of proximity to a metro station is a little more
complicated. The positive coeﬃcient for the METRO DIST variable in model 1 is
surprising at first. But there are two competing location eﬀects of metro station prox-
imity: easy access to mass transportation and the countervailing negative externality
from pedestrian congestion, noise, or other negative externalities from the metro sta-
tion. Our metro distance variable appears to be picking up a combination of both
eﬀects. In order to try sorting out these competing eﬀects on land value, we define
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CLOSE as a binary variable indicating land parcels lying within 0.3 km of a metro
station andWALK as a variable indicating land parcels within easy walking distance
of a metro station, which is assumed to be 0.5 km. If the negative externalities from
the metro station are localized, as we expect they are, then CLOSE should pick up
the diﬀerential eﬀect of the externality on the immediate neighborhood whileWALK
picks up the positive value of accessibility. The estimates from models 2-6 in Table
4 are consistent with the expected pattern. The CLOSE coeﬃcient is negative and
significant in all cases, picking up the extremely localized negative externality of the
metro station. The WALK coeﬃcient is positive but insignificant in all of the mod-
els.5 This pattern either indicates that metro station access is suﬃciently ubiquitous
in the sample areas to not lead to diﬀerential eﬀects on price or that surface trans-
portation provides a good substitute for the metro system in the residential areas in
our sample. The latter is consistent with the widely-held notion that the integrated
network of subways and buses provides an eﬃcient public transportation network for
the city. Further, road congestion is not severe for taxis and private automobiles. In
conjunction with the small area occupied by the city, the mild road congestion means
that surface travel is relatively easy; travel time from the remote area to the CBD is
generally only 30 minutes.
LnSIZE is the log of lot size and is included in the hedonic price function to control
for the nonlinear relationship between size and price attributed to land assembly and
subdivision costs (Colwell and Munneke, 1997, 1999; Colwell and Sirmans, 1980;
Thorsnes and McMillen, 1998). The significantly positive coeﬃcient found in all of
the estimated models is evidence of plottage. Our results suggest that the government
has solved the land assembly problem for developers by using its police power to
consolidate individual vacant plots into the single contiguous parcels oﬀered for sale
in the auction.
PLOT RATIO reflects the maximum allowed floor area-land area ratio for the
site. Like lot size zoning in the U.S., this restriction can be envisioned as following
the market or as a binding regulatory constraint, the former case yielding insignif-
5The variable remains insignificance when walking distance is extended to include sites as far
away as 0.8 km from a metro station.
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icant and the latter significant price eﬀects. In our application, the coeﬃcient is
significantly positive; allowing greater structural density increases land value. Thus,
this constraint is binding on developers in our sample, which is consistent with the
common view held by market participants.
We also include the variable MIXED USE in model 4 to capture site value eﬀects
from allowing mixed retail or oﬃce space in the primarily residential development.
(The retail or oﬃce uses are typically restricted to the ground floor of multi-story de-
velopments.) The estimated coeﬃcient is positive but not significant. The residence-
only restriction on most of the sold sites is not binding on the market, that is, the
use restriction appears to follow the market in Singapore.
4.2 Buyer characteristics
Our next question concerns why buyer characteristics might systematically aﬀect
selling prices. Price discrimination is one classic explanation for systematic price
diﬀerences across types of buyers. While this argument is not broadly applicable, it
remains relevant in special cases. In his study of land pricing in a large Ghanian city,
Asabere (1981) pointed out that the traditional institutions give local Ashanti chiefs
power to dominate the local land market. The chiefs practice price discrimination in
the allocation of land by favoring Ashanti over non-Ashanti land users; the former
only pay 55% of the land price that would prevail in the absence of the chiefs’ local
monopoly power. The price discrimination persists in equilibrium because the local
chiefs are able to prevent the Ashantis from engaging in arbitrage with non-Ashantis
because all land transfers are subject to their approval. But most real estate markets
operate under private property regimes that are closer to fee simple. In such cases,
price discrimination cannot persist.
The literature oﬀers other rationales for why buyer characteristics might aﬀect
the selling price of real estate assets. For example, Sirmans, Turnbull, and Benjamin
(1990) and Sirmans and Turnbull (1993) use search theory to examine how buyer
and seller characteristics can aﬀect selling prices of houses, focusing on how diﬀerent
characteristics or information sets alter the optimal search strategy of buyers and
reservation prices of sellers. In a diﬀerent vein, Harding, Knight, and Sirmans (2003),
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and Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) consider how the bargaining skill or bar-
gaining power of buyers relative to sellers is reflected in selling prices of houses. Buyer
characteristics are then reflected in selling prices to the extent that the characteristics
systematically vary with relative bargaining skill or power.
In the auction model explained here, however, buyer characteristics aﬀect the op-
timal bidding strategy. This eﬀect is the auction analogue to the neoclassical bid-rent
model in which diﬀerent types of buyers (or, more accurately, diﬀerent categories of
land uses) have bid rents that lie either above or below that of their rival buyer
types. In this vein, Chicoine (1981) argues that the type of buyer and seller involved
in the sale (whether an individual, corporation, partnership or land trust) should be
expected to aﬀect the selling price of fringe farmland. Chicoine’s rationale can be
demonstrated within the context of the neoclassical bid-rent model; diﬀerences in
market information, access to capital, legal status, as well as non-pecuniary prefer-
ences all aﬀect the profitability of the parcel of land to that particular type of buyer,
hence the bid rent and selling price. Nonetheless, Chicoine’s rationale also fits within
the auction framework described earlier.
Following earlier studies, we use observable buyer characteristics as proxies for
likely diﬀerences in information, ability, or incentives.6 The first of the buyer char-
acteristics variables in our models, EXPERIENCE, is a binary variable indicating
whether or not the highest bidder has previous experience as a developer. Our sup-
position is that experienced developers will have greater ability to extract higher
expected returns from a given proposed project. At the same time, the more expe-
rienced developer will have better information or greater ability to foresee and react
to contingencies, leading to lower project riskiness. In terms of the auction model,
the higher expected returns means that more experienced developers populate the
upper range of expected project value distribution while the lower ε−risk leads to an
upward shift in the bid strategy curve in Figure 1; both eﬀects lead to higher bids,
hence higher selling prices when experienced developers are the highest bidders.7
6Chicoine (1981), Sirmans, Turnbull, and Benjamin (1990), Sirmans and Turnbull (1993), Hard-
ing, Knight, and Sirmans (2003), and Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003).
7A contrary argument can be oﬀered as well. If inexperienced firms systematically over-estimate
the expected returns from the land parcel, then this aspect of inexperience leads such firms pay more
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The second variable reflecting observable buyer characteristics is PUBLIC, a bi-
nary variable indicating whether the highest bidder is publicly listed or privately
owned. Publicly listed companies have access to lower cost capital than do privately
owned firms, capital they can exploit to further reduce their profit risk with portfolios
of diverse development projects. In terms of our auction framework, publicly listed
companies have lower εω−risk, which also shifts the bid strategy curve upwards in
Figure 1 from aa to cc. This leads to higher selling prices when publicly listed firms
are the highest bidders.
Finally, we include the binary variable JOINT indicating whether or not the
successful bid was made by a joint venture. Given the portfolio eﬀect of the joint
venture is to reduce εω−risk much like the publicly traded relative to the privately
owned firm, we expect joint ventures to have higher optimal bids, ceteris paribus,
leading to a higher selling price.
The estimated coeﬃcients on these variables in the hedonic price function are
robust across all of the models. Looking at the estimates reported in Table 4, publicly
listed companies do pay more for the land than do their privately owned counterparts,
a result consistent with the auction and bid-price models. On the other hand, we find
that neither prior development experience nor joint venture structure have significant
price eﬀects.
4.3 Competition and information
One point emphasized earlier was that the auction model leads to precisely the same
predictions as the neoclassical bid-price model with respect to all of the examined
underlying parameters—except for one: the degree of competition. The neoclassical
bid-price model assumes a large number of atomistic potential buyers in order to
drive the bid of each type to where risk-adjusted profit is zero. The auction model,
however, presents an explicit framework tying the number of rival buyers to each
buyer’s optimal bidding strategy, thereby tracing the competition-price nexus that
for the land than their more experienced counterparts, ceteris paribus. Of course, the risk eﬀect
identified in the text still reduces the optimal bid of inexperienced firms (unless they systematically
under-estimate the project risk as well), leading to a net ambiguous eﬀect.
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cannot be formally addressed within the neoclassical bid-price model.
Our basic measure of competition is simply the number of bidders in the auction.
In the auction model, increasing N, ceteris paribus, shifts the optimal bid strategy
function in Figure 1 upwards from aa to cc. As this holds for all participants, in-
creasing N increases the expected selling price as well. The variable NUMBER is the
number of bidders in the empirical models 1-5 in Table 4. The theoretical auction
model predicts a positive eﬀect on selling price and, indeed, in all of the estimated
models the number of bidders has a significant positive eﬀect on selling price. Simply
put, the larger the number of competing buyers, the closer the equilibrium comes to
the neoclassical bid-price equilibrium.
In models 3-6 we introduce a variety of other measures of competition. Since
none of these alternatives are as closely related to the competition measure in the
theoretical model as is NUMBER, they are to some extent ad hoc proxies. Nonethe-
less, they yield additional insights and, if nothing else, reaﬃrm the robustness of the
above result across a variety of specifications. Section 2 claimed that an auction with
a single bidder can be viewed as a two-bidder auction, given that the single bidder
in Singapore’s SOS auctions must bid against the (uncertain to bidder) reservation
price. Still, it is reasonable to wonder if such single-bidder auctions really do conform
with theory. In order to test whether or not single bidder auctions aﬀect prices dif-
ferently than do multiple bidder auctions, we introduce the binary variable SINGLE
to pick up systematic eﬀects associated with this characteristic in models 3-6. As
predicted by the theory, the single bid does not lead to a diﬀerent pricing outcome
once the eﬀects of minimal competition are taken into account; in models 3-5 the
NUMBER variable is highly significant and positive while the SINGLE BID dummy
variable is insignificant in every case. Only when the NUMBER variable is removed
from model 6 does the SINGLE variable become significantly negative. This case,
of course, is simply picking up the eﬀect of greater competition as measured by the
now-omitted number of bidders variable. Single bidder auctions yield lower selling
prices than others solely because the level of competition among buyers is minimized
in such auctions. The estimates reveal no evidence that the simple auction model
breaks down for the single bidder case.
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We also introduce PRICE DIST in models 1-6. This variable is intended to pick
up the eﬀects of readily available price information for surrounding parcels on the
selling price of a particular parcel. It is calculated as the average price (S$ psm) of
the five most recent land sales weighted by their distance (in km) to the subject site.
To measure the information conveyed by earlier sales, PRICE DIST is constructed
using only sales that took place before the subject auction date. Although intended
to capture information about the surrounding market, the spatial weighting in this
variable may also be picking up any price arising from unmeasured amenities or other
neighborhood-specific eﬀects. In either case, the auction model predicts a positive
relationship between this variable and selling price. If the variable simply conveys
information about conditions in the surrounding market, whether supply and demand
conditions or underlying neighborhood amenity values, then higher values of PRICE
DIST indicate greater underlying value for the parcel being auctioned (that is, a
higher v, reflected in a rightward movement along the optimal bid strategy curve
in Figure 1). Consistent with our expectations, the estimated coeﬃcients on this
variable are positive and highly significant in all of the estimated models. Can and
Megbolugbe (1997) find similar spatial relationships among selling prices of houses
in a non-auction setting.
Finally, models 5 and 6 include additional proxies that intended to measure com-
petition. COMP is calculated as the total number of forthcoming bids divided by
the total number of other auctions taking place within 30 days before and after the
auction for the site. This variable is intended to pick up the eﬀects of competing auc-
tions; we expect that a greater number of auctions (which reduces COMP) reduces
the competition among bidders for any given site, thereby reducing bids and selling
price. Similarly, we expect that a greater number of potential buyers participating in
other auctions (which increases COMP) reflects a greater level of overall competition
in the land market, leading to higher bids and selling price. If our expectations are
correct, then these two eﬀects lead to a positive coeﬃcient on COMP in the land
price function. The estimate only is significantly positive in model 6 when the number
of bidders is omitted from the regression.
We also include the number of other auctions taking place within the same 60-day
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window around a given auction, OTHER AUCT. If the auctions were being oﬀered
by competing sellers, then our argument in the previous paragraph would lead us
to expect a negative OTHER AUCT eﬀect on selling price. In the SOS program,
however, there is a monopoly seller: the government. Thus, the estimated eﬀect of
OTHER AUCT on price instead will reveal the extent to which the two government
agencies are successfully exploiting their monopoly power by timing site auctions to
yield greater total returns. Models 5 and 6 both reveal a significant positive eﬀect of
OTHER AUCT on selling price. Apparently, the government has been successfully
spacing the site sales to take advantage of market conditions, oﬀering more sites for
sale in stronger markets and cutting back in weaker markets. The temporary cessation
of auctions during the downturn of 1998-99 reported in Table 1 is consistent with this
interpretation.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the price formation process under small numbers competition,
reporting empirical evidence from first-price sealed bid land auctions undertaken over
an extended period in Singapore. Auction theory predicts that bid prices are less than
the zero-profit asset value in these first-price sealed-bid auctions and that the opti-
mal bids from potential buyers rise with the number of bidders. When coupled with
Mayer’s (1995) argument that increasing the number of bidders increases the likeli-
hood of a high-value bidder participant, both eﬀects together provide the prediction
that the expected auction price rises with the number of active bidders, a robust
empirical result observed in the Singapore auction data.
The empirical estimates also provide evidence of plottage and show that gov-
ernment land use controls on allowed structural density are binding constraints on
developers. On the other hand, restrictions on mixed land uses are generally not
binding and follow the market. Auction prices rise with greater auction frequency
over the time period examined, which suggests the government agencies are successful
in their attempts to manage the number and frequency of auctions to take advantage
of periods of market strength and avoid further depressing property values during
19
periods of market decline.
Previous studies use information or search cost diﬀerences across agents (Sirmans,
Turnbull, and Benjamin, 1990; Sirmans and Turnbull, 1993) or diﬀerences in bargain-
ing power (Harding, Knight, and Sirmans, 2003; Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans,
2003) to explain how buyer or seller characteristics can aﬀect real estate asset prices.
The auction model shows how diﬀerences in information or development skills are
directly reflected in bidding strategies, providing a simple channel through which
buyer characteristics aﬀect the sales price. We find that neither prior development
experience nor joint venture structure significantly aﬀect bid price, results that are
both surprising and at variance with the auction model prediction. Finally, the em-
pirical estimates show that publicly listed companies bid more than do privately held
companies. This result by itself implies that winning an auction will increase the
capitalized value of closely held companies more than the eﬀect found by Ching and
Fu (2003) and Ooi and Sirmans (2004) for publicly traded companies.
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Figure 1. Bid strategy function b(v) 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of sites sold by year  
 
      Year No. Average Price (S$ million) Total Price (S$ million) 
1990 5 25.414       127.070 
1991 6 39.497 236.982 
1992 13 34.398 447.174 
1993 16 75.020 1,200.320 
1994 24 106.626       2,559.024 
1995 29 74.229       2,152.641 
1996 33 97.970       3,233.010 
1997 38 128.069       4,866.622 
2000 21 83.775       1,759.275 
2001 12 90.750       1,089.000 
2002 5 88.718       443.590 
Total 202 89.677 18,114.708 
  * US1 equals approximately S$ 1.80 as at end 2002.  
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
 
• PRICE is the winning bid in S$.  
• SIZE is the area of the land parcel in sq m.  
• CBD is the distance in km to the Central Business District.  
• METRO DIST is the distance in km to the nearest metro station.  
• CLOSE is a binary variable indicating land parcels lying within 300 m of a metro station.  
• WALK is a binary variable indicating land parcels lying within easy walking distance from the 
metro station, which is assumed to be 0.5 km.  
• PLOT RATIO reflects the maximum allowed floor area-land area ratio for the site. 
• MIXED USE is a binary variable indicating land parcels which allow ancillary retail and office 
space in primarily residential development.  
• EXPERIENCE is a binary variable indicating or not the highest bidder has previous experience as 
a developer. 
• PUBLIC is a binary variable indicating the highest bidder is a publicly listed company.  
• JOINT is a binary variable indicating the successful bid is by a joint venture.  
• NUMBER is the number of bidders in the auction.  
• SINGLE indicates only one bid submitted for a particular site (11 such incidents). 
• PRICE DIST is the average price (S$ psm) of five comparable land sales prior to bid weighted by 
their relative distance to the subject site.  
• COMP is the total number of bids divided by total number of auctions for other land sales within a 
fixed window of 30 days before and after the observed land sale. This is intended to measure the 
relative strength of vacant land demand around the time of the observed sale.  
• OTHER AUCT is the total number of auctions within a fixed window of 30 days before and after 
the observed land sale.  
• TIME INDEX is a running number from 1 to 13 to capture the time effects through the study 
period. 1990 =1, 1991 =2, …., 2002=13.  
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 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistic is based on 202 observations.  
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
       
PRICE 89,676,500 82,340,200 2,765,310 682,800,000 2.441 15.261 
SIZE 19,115 16,354 910 125,913 2.859 16.078 
CBD 9.722 4.595 0.924 23.080 0.261 2.732 
METRO DIST 1.311 0.953 0.080 4.060 0.890 2.905 
CLOSE 0.114 0.318 0.000 1.000 2.425 6.877 
WALK 0.297 0.458 0.000 1.000 0.886 1.780 
PLOT RATIO 1.959 0.995 0.800 8.400 1.341 9.871 
MIXED USE 0.050 0.217 0.000 1.000 4.143 18.162 
EXPERIENCE 0.886 0.318 0.000 1.000 -2.425 6.877 
PUBLIC 0.495 0.501 0.000 1.000 0.020 0.995 
JOINT  0.158 0.366 0.000 1.000 1.866 4.478 
NUMBER  6.267 3.462 1.000 20.000 0.975 4.320 
SINGLE  0.050 0.217 0.000 1.000 4.143 18.162 
PRICE DIST 2,714.1 966.7 425.2 6,625.0 0.383 4.305 
COMP 6.128 1.997 0.250 10.667 0.295 3.339 
OTHER AUCT 5.926 3.483 1.000 13.000 0.401 2.097 
TIME INDEX 6.876 2.872 1.000 13.000 0.265 2.569 
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Table 3. Hedonic Land Auction Price Function Estimates 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 7.1278** 
(0.5355) 
7.14976** 
(0.5196) 
6.4583** 
(0.4238) 
6.3723** 
(0.4092) 
5.7168** 
(0.4785) 
5.8334** 
(0.4803) 
lnSIZE 0.93106** 
(0.0510) 
0.9043** 
(0.0451) 
0.9961** 
(0.0385) 
1.0036** 
(0.0369) 
1.0330** 
(0.0383) 
1.0244** 
(0.0378) 
CBD -0.0170* 
(0.0079) 
-0.0002 
(0.0025) 
-0.0271** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0275** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0296** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0329** 
(0.0066) 
METRO DIST 0.0173* 
(0.0080) 
     
CLOSE  -0.2523** 
(0.1076) 
-0.2940** 
(0.0966) 
-0.2860** 
(0.0993) 
-0.3151** 
(0.1054) 
-0.2761** 
(0.1110) 
WALK  0.0158 
(0.6451) 
0.0565 
(0.0660) 
0.0588 
(0.0664) 
0.0693 
(0.0604) 
0.0680 
(0.0628) 
PLOT RATIO 0.4224* 
(0.055) 
0.4657** 
(0.0551) 
0.4677** 
(0.0510) 
0.4538** 
(0.053) 
0.4680** 
(0.0521) 
0.4862** 
(0.0534) 
MIXED USE    0.1938 
(0.1528) 
0.2453 
(0.1688) 
0.2614 
(0.1671) 
EXPERIENCE -0.0093 
(0.1051) 
0.0159 
(0.0979) 
-0.05231 
(0.0976) 
-0.0302 
(0.1001) 
0.0087 
(0.0951) 
-0.0033 
(0.1029) 
PUBLIC 0.1108* 
(0.0568) 
0.1124* 
(0.0574) 
0.1439** 
(0.0545) 
0.1497** 
(0.0542) 
0.1670** 
(0.0529) 
0.1870** 
(0.0561) 
JOINT -0.0828 
(0.0736) 
-0.0826 
(0.0729) 
-0.0791 
(0.0684) 
-0.0841 
(0.0683) 
-0.0816 
(0.0697) 
-0.0654 
(0.0679) 
NUMBER 0.0430** 
(0.0108) 
0.0498** 
(0.0111) 
0.0434** 
(0.0099) 
0.0445** 
(0.0098) 
0.0402** 
(0.0112) 
 
SINGLE   -0.20461 
(0.1579) 
-0.2058 
(0.1652) 
-0.0219 
(0.1705) 
-0.3906** 
(0.1607) 
PRICE DIST 0.0019** 
(0.00004) 
0.0019** 
(0.00004) 
0.0003** 
(0.00004) 
0.0002** 
(0.00004) 
0.0002** 
(0.00004) 
0.0002** 
(0.00004) 
COMP     0.0171 
(0.0206) 
0.0537** 
(0.0182) 
OTHER AUCT     0.0334** 
(0.0103) 
0.0358** 
(0.0107) 
TIME INDEX 0.0571** 
(0.0146) 
0.0507** 
(0.0153) 
0.0471** 
(0.0134) 
0.0498** 
(0.0132) 
0.0700** 
(0.0152) 
0.0692** 
(0.0153) 
Adj. R2 .8342 .8332 .8611 .8619 .8693 .8594 
F-statistic 102.15** 92.29** 101.23** 94.16** 87.03** 85.70** 
d.f.  191 190 182 181 179 180 
 
Notes: 
   Dependent variable is LnPRICE. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 
 *Significant at 10% level (one tail). 
**Significant at 5% level (one tail). 
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